Defence Notes

New Delhi, 12 March 2007

 Unplanned Exercise

MORE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

By B.K. Mathur

The budgetary allocation for the coming financial year includes Rs.41,922 for capital outlay and Rs.37,458 for revenue expenditure (day-to-day expenditure) as against Rs.89,000 crore and 34,458 crore respectively initially earmarked for the current fiscal.  This means that India’s defence spending will continue to hover around 2.5 per cent of the GDP against the experts’ defence demand of 3 per cent. There is always a demand for more and more to spend, even if you can’t do it. But the most important point is that India’s defence spending continues to be less than that of immediate neighbours Pakistan and China, which have been spending around 4.5 per cent of their GDPs. But of greater concern is that the modernization plans will continue to go on in its typically slow manner, leading to failure to spend what has been allocated for the purpose.

Why does this recurring ghost of unspent funds continue to haunt India’s arms modernization programme? Failure of the Defence Ministry to improve its procurement procedures which continue to be faulty despite thoughtful recommendations of the Group of Ministers (GoM) after the Kargil operation in 1999. In fact, if one goes by the “committed liabilities” of the Defence Ministry towards procurement of weapons and weapon systems, a major chunk of the capital outlay of Rs.41,922 crore proposed for the next fiscal should go in terms of installments towards big deals for armaments signed in recent years. Most of these deals took a long time to finalise, resulting in cost escalations and failure to fully utilize the allotted funds.

These deals include the French Scorpene submarine project costing Rs.18,798 crore, the Russian Admiral Gorshkov aircraft carrier deal for the Navy for Rs.6,900 crore, Rs.,8,000-crore British Hawk deal and the Israel Phalcon AWACS deal costing Rs.5,000 crore. The Army too has projected a plan for its artillery modernization at a cost of Rs.8,000 to 10,000 crore. Besides these, the Defence Ministry should be finalising soon its other proposals, including the Indian Air Force’s urgent requirement for fighter aircraft. It is more than one year since the Government had agreed in principle for the procurement of 126 fighter aircraft to replace the earlier outdated versions of the MiG aircraft. Informal offers have already been made by different producers, but lack of planning, not funds, is mainly responsible for the delay. 

In fact, successive Finance Ministers have followed faulty budgeting system for the armed forces all these years. In a well-researched write-up, a retired Colonel, P.K. Vasudeva, states: the “system should ensure that the right amount is spent on defence in the light of the pattern on national priorities and the right military capabilities are developed in the light of the structure of security priorities… the defence budget, in short, must be seen not only in terms of what we must defend ourselves against but what we have to defend… Once the tasks are defined, the question of building up the capabilities to perform them follows by formulation of plans for specific programmes.

“If the scarce resources are to be spent efficiently for defence the budget has to be the vehicle for implementing the programmes so planned.  This has not been possible in Indiassions and objectives”. as defence budgets are drawn up in terms of inputs (amounts spent on acquisition of arms, personnel etc) and not programmes designed to enable the defence to meet the tasks set for them. Equipment is acquired without taking account of the personnel required to use them or their training. Budgets in defence are focused heavily on “acquisition” rather than on building capabilities. No such exercise has far been undertaken to ensure that the budgetary provisions for the armed forces are based on their “mi

In an effort to ensure the objectives and accountability, the concept of Planning Programming and Budgeting (PPB) was introduced in the United States during the 1960s.  The UK too followed this method. But subsequently it was found inadequate to link the military strategy with defence budgeting. The concept of Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) was then introduced for a five-yearly comprehensive review of the force structure, modernization plans and other elements of the military planning and programming for the next 20 years. Unfortunately, India’s planners and financial advisers have failed to follow what the militarily advanced countries like in US and the UK practise while planning budgets for their armed forces.

In fact, it is necessary to have in place some institutional system for budgeting for the armed forces, with much say of the Defence Ministry, which presently does not have any decision-making authority for military budgeting. The Financial Adviser (Defence Services) draws up the budget on the basis of the projection of the three military Services in isolation after, of course, bilateral discussions with the Service Headquarters and the Finance Division. The allocation is routinely decided on the basis of previous years, budget provisions and revised expenditure towards the end of the financial year and ongoing programmes without even caring the progress in those programmes finalized without working out priorities.

Again, there is need to take note of what happens in the UK before finalizing the annual budgetary allocations for the armed forces on the basis of the QDR—the 20-year plan which, remember, the late Jagjeevan Ram had thought of seriously as the Defence Minister but failed to implement the idea because of vested interests which cared more for personal gains rather than national interest. In Britain there is a Council, headed by the Defence Minister. It takes all policy decisions in consultation with the Service Chiefs and expert advisers on military strategies and force levels required to execute the strategy and lay down policy framework as the main guideline for working out the defence budget. We need to have such institutions like a defence council or defence management board.

The long-planning concept for defence budgeting, first proposed by the Plawden Committee of the UK, necessarily requires honest integration of the Service headquarters with the Defence Ministry which has been suggested by various experts and this column for years. A meaningful budget for the armed forces has need to be prepared by a body, “committee or a council or whatever you name it, comprising the Service Chiefs, Defence Secretary and the other Defence departments under the Defence Minister. It is only this body which should take decisions that alone should guide the budget-makes. Routine budgeting should now stop in national interest.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 26 February 2007

Exploit Indigenous Expertise

LACUNAE IN DEFENCE PRODUCTION POLICY

By B.K. Mathur

The missile-man, as we knew Kalam Sahib as the Chief of the Defence Ministry’s Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) only gave the example of the indigenously-developed BrahMos missile and stated that the Organisation has been asked to suggest a vision for the weapon’s platform and sensors at an affordable cost. As the history of the DRDO tells us, the young scientists of the Organisation are capable of achieving the target given to them in the required timeframe. They are the envy of the world for designing and developing state-of-the-art weapons and weapon systems. The only problem is their production, which led to the Wing Commander’s observation: By the time the weapon is inducted into the force it becomes obsolete.

The DRDO’s contribution to the country’s armed forces is well-known. The defence scientists and technicians have been designing and developing over the years military machines and systems comparable with the ones produced in the developed countries whose defence industry is their main economic activity. But the problem, as noticed earlier, invariably arises at the production stage, giving one the impression that the seven defence public sector enterprises and 40 Ordnance factories across the country lack the capability to produce the state-of-the-art machines and systems. However, this is far from the truth. They have the capability and wherewithal to produce the latest, as proved by their performances since 1962, after the Chinese invasion and again after the Kargil confrontation in 1999.

 The largest Departmentally-run undertaking is presently meeting all the requirements of the armed forces and, importantly, can be trusted to produce all that we prefer to import for reasons other than quality and for creating defence scandals. The latest Ordnance factory has the capacity to produce not only the ammunition for the Bofors gun but also the capability to produce indigenously 155 mm. howitzer gun under technology transfer agreement. Alas, our defence planners have preferred to get the howitzers for the Indian Army from abroad. The production capability of this factory includes that of the India’s main battle tank, the controversial MBT-Arjun.

The history of the production of the MBT-Arjun clearly highlights the snag, better call it tragedy of the Government of India’s indigenous defence production policy that has caused unpardonably long delays in such important machines like the Arjun, which was initially named MBT-72, as it was expected to be produced in 1972, and the light combat aircraft (LCA).  The whole trouble is about the absence of a well-considered military equipment policy. Take, for example again, the story of the MBT. The Army first asked during the 1960s for a 1,000 hp power-pack (engine) and then revised it to 1500 hp, perhaps without realizing that it takes nearly 15 years to design, develop and produce such an engine. That is the reason why the Arjun tank is presently being produced with an imported power-pack, causing delay and, importantly, necessitating off-the-shelf procurement from Russia of the T-series tanks.  

The result of such an ill-advised policy causes not only undue delays and increasing uncertainly of indigenous projects that leads to a rush for imports and, concernedly, the scandals and corruption associated with defence projects which, at times, causes import of even sub-standard or obsolete machines at high costs, despite the fact that we have an indigenous production capability which matches any other in the world. Not only that. This policy of the vested interests and corrupt persons, has caused neglect of the Ordnance factories’ expertise. Several of these factories have been crying for long about the need for modernizing their outdated machines and updating marketing technologies through which much foreign exchange could be earned through exports of some of their produce.

In this context it is necessary to understand some facts about the defence industry which make it quite different from the civil, profit-making industry. First, a modern and sophisticated equipment has a large number of components running into thousands, and that too of different heads like the electronic ammunition, fire power and all that. What this leads to is that no one set of scientists and technicians can possibly look into the production of all the components. Importantly, no defence production unit in the world, even in highly militarily advanced countries can produce all the components under one roof---and one unit. It is economically not viable. Interdependence is necessary in the defence industry.

Some years ago this writer was told in Bangalore, the hub of defence industry, that an American defence production company was importing from India certain small components for production of a highly-sophisticated gas-turbine engine. This was later confirmed by Kalam Sahib, then Chief of the DRDO. The explanation for this import was simple.  It was economic for the US company to import that particular component from India or anywhere else, because it was pointless to set up a special production facility at high costs. But over a period of time the private sector industry in the US has grown and set up separate facilities for production of even the smallest of components since the entire industry there is export-oriented and is a major component of the national economy.

India’s civil industry could also chip in and set up facilities which could not only be used at home but also exported. The defence industry has been suffering considerably for decades due to massive imports of highly-sophisticated machinery. In fact, India’s defence forces became so much dependent on imports that not much effort was made to indigenize production of even ordinary equipment. No doubt, the industry has license-produced most of the machinery as per the Government policy. But in that process it did not concentrate much on the production of spares, leading to a major crisis for India’s armed forces.

Doubtless, the crisis has always been caused by the Government’s ill-advised production and import policies, which call for a fresh look, keeping in view the fact that our scientists and technocrats are inferior to none in the world. If they are given the required inputs and resources, sans the politics and the interests of the file-pushers in the Government, they are capable of producing anything the forces need. The practice of always running for imports could be eliminated and the expertise available indigenously exploited without compromising on quality. The only thing is to have the will and right direction of the defence policy-makers.---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 12 February 2007

 Corps Of Signals

ARMY’S CENTRAL NERVE SYSTEM

By B.K. Mathur

In the fast-changing concept of modern warfare, one can win or lose without fighting a full-fledged conventional battle on the ground. But, remember, one fundamental rule of the war game remains unchanged from the time immemorial: need for a fighting force of a perfect communication system in a war theatre of any kind, which includes the present day’s missile and counter-missile war scenario. That is the responsibility of the Corps of Signals, rightly described as the central nerve system, the slightest malfunctioning of which can paralyse the best of military operation. The Signal units provide complete coordination and electronic warfare support to the fighting forces and operational communication for the Navy and the Air Force, which have now come to occupy a dominant role in modern warfare.

Happily, the communication system in India’s armed forces has developed from time to time, thanks to the country’s young scientists and the Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO). The induction of the state-of-the-art communication systems in the armed forces, like the AREN-Area grid system, have proved once more that India’s defence scientists and technicians are not lagging behind anyone in the world, given, of course, the required financial backing, which is invariably lacking more due to bureaucratic hassles and bad planning. Notwithstanding the handicaps, the continuous improvements in transistors and integrated circuits have not only led to miniaturisation and module construction, but also to the whole question in the field on electronics and communication techniques.

 This kind of developed system is required because the field force now needs fully integrated and automated, secure, reliable and high-speed communication in semi-nuclear or conventional battlefield of the future. Remember, when sword was the main weapon of a soldier on foot and a horse and a lance of a cavalry man, the system was quite different. Today, when a conventional army operation involves a tank, automatic firing systems and missiles, supported by massive air operations, information is required to travel much faster, through electronic equipments. Even if an operation is on a battalion level in a far-flung border area, the Army Headquarters at New Delhi is required to have blow-by-blow account on “one-up one down” basis. In other words, a message travelling step by step.

The Indian Army in the past and now has maintained a good standard of communication too.  Looking at the equipment the Corps of Signals has today and the R&D efforts made by the Defence Ministry’s Bharat Electronics Ltd. (BEL), one is inclined to believe that India is way ahead of others in the region. Once our own satellites which our scientists have been launching from time to time are being fully used for our defence communication networks, India’s information system in the armed forces in times of operations will doubtlessly be as competent as that of advanced countries.

 The Army Signals made a humble beginning on February 15, 1911 with the establishment of two Companies. At that time most of the Signal Officers and tradesmen were British. It was only in 1933 as part of a drive towards Indianisation that a Boys Company was raised at Jabalpur. The World War II saw a large-scale expansion of the Signals and its greater Indianisation 0to meet the manpower requirement. With India declaring itself a Republic on January 26, 1950, the Signals were designated as the Corps of Signals---and the process of equipping the Corps with modern equipment started in earnest. After the Chinese aggression in 1962, heavy demands fell on the Signals. The vintage war equipment was replaced by more sophisticated and modern systems.

 The Corps of Signals was perhaps the first in India to launch the introduction of electronic data processing.  Way back in 1964, it stressed the importance of computers as an essential tool for operational and administrative management in the day-to-day use. It was then realized that design-making and processing massive amount of information and data in an ever-shrinking time-frame can only be possible with efficient computer services backing at all levels.  The military Exchange at present handles on an average about 5,000 calls daily and the Signals Centre about 3,000 messages per days from the Army Headquarters. That is in peace time.  Imagine, what the position will be in time of war. Added to this is the painstaking job of enciphering and deciphering the messages.

The phenomenal increase in the density of electronic, electrical and electro-magnetic devices and systems which the armed forces are required to use in a confined geographical area are bound to generate electro- magnetic interference (EMI).  It could prove catastrophic, rendering the complete system totally ineffective.  In fact, this is one of the major problems on which the Defence scientists are increasingly engaged, as the systems are upgraded regularly.  A project study on the subject had been undertaken sometime back with considerable success to ensure the vital electro-magnetic compatibility. This has become more relevant in the present-day context as the concept   of warfare now is bound to extend from land, air and sea to the dimension of electro-magnetic space. This is challenge number one for the Signalmen of the armed forces.

Indeed, the Corps of Signals has kept pace with the revolutionary progress made in the field of communication electronics the world over.  But what about the men of the Corps, required to use the new equipment and systems? The personnel of the  Corps, particularly the tradesmen at the lower levels, are not being “sophisticated” at the speed on which the equipment is being modernized, despite the fact that the training institutions have increased in number and some Officers are sent abroad regularly to upgrade their knowledge.  Taken as a whole, the quality of intake in the Indian Army has of late gone down. But in technical arms like the Signals, this setback is alarming.

What really is happening is that the electronics being a new field, qualified youngmen are finding better prospects in civil employment.  And, alarmingly, the Officers and men of the Corps of Signals rush to put in their papers the moment rules allow them to do so, to be able to take up more lucrative civil opportunities. There is an urgent need to put a stop to this trend, realizing that no war---conventional, nuclear or semi-nuclear---can be fought without a fool-proof communication system. The Signals have always been the Indian Army’s plus point, from the times when pigeons were used to convey messages to the present-day gadgets.  The tradition need to be maintained even with the latest, modern systems of communication. Any lapse on this front would mean a crisis situation in the armed forces.---INFA

(Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)

Defence Notes

New Delhi, 29 January 2007

  Brothers In Arms

INDIA-RUSSIA STRATEGIC TIES

By B.K. Mathur

 The Soviet Union, now disintegrated with Russia continuing to be the main producer of state-of-the-art military machines, came to India’s rescue by selling its equipment against deferred rupee payments. That helped India to procure supersonic aircraft of the MiG series, MiG-19, which the Indian Air Force needed desperately after the Chinese invasion in 1962. Significantly, the fighter jets were purchased not only on deferred rupee payment basis but also on transfer of technology basis that facilitated their licensed production in India.  The strategic partnership developed fast and the Soviet machines began to be inducted into the Indian Navy in a big way, which made the sea force a blue water Navy.  It showed its strength as the famous missile boat attack off Karachi proved in 1971.

That alarmed the Western powers, especially the Americans who also offered their military machines to India. These machines were definitely superior to those produced by the Soviet Union, but India stuck to its relationship with Moscow for three reasons. One, the Soviets were dependable suppliers. Two, the payments were made in rupees. Three, and most significantly, the machines were procured on transfer of technology basis and later produced in India. In fact, Indira Gandhi as the Prime Minister initially spurred all offers of highly-sophisticated machines from the Western countries, mostly from America, Britain and France, without the transfer of technology. She relied on dependable friends in need and opted even for inferior machines.

 At present, things have drastically changed. The market scenario has changed, India is high on foreign exchange and, significantly, Western arms producers have started selling their military machines and weapon systems without any conditions and with transfer of technology. Each one of the military equipment producer is today hardselling his machines. An open commercial competition is the order of the day, both for the Western producers and the Russians. The latter may have advantage of being long and dependable brothers in arms. Nevertheless, where highly-expensive machines are to be bought, the defence planners have need to consider all things required for a good purchase in an open global market.

Today, the mighty producers of military equipment, the Russian and American defence industries are competing with each other globally.  Both have made a strong pitch for their latest state-of-the-art fighter planes to bag the Indian Air Force’s 6.5 billion dollar multirole combat aircraft. President Putin has tried to hardsell Russia’s latest MiG version, MiG-35 which has a stiff competition from the American F-16 and F/A 18, French Rafale, Swedes JAS-39 Gripen and the European Consortium’s Typhoon. India has to make its choice and while doing so the defence planners have only to keep in mind their friendship and cooperation with Russia in military technology, which the two countries reiterated at the sixth meeting of the bilateral Inter-Governmental Commission during Putin’s visit.

At the same time, however, the terms and conditions of all the offers need to be studied carefully and the selection of military machines be made on merit.  Whatever decision is taken must be done fast, especially for the Indian Air Force’s demands. Presently, the combat Squadron strength of the force is fast depleting and the IAF brass is worried over the need to maintain its strategic strike capability and fighting edge in the context of the threat posed from across the border. Pakistan’s plan to acquire 30 latest F-16 fighters from the USChina’s decision to make available to Pakistan the Airborne Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) along with most advanced fighter aircraft is worrisome.  Added to this is the inordinate delay and uncertainties in the developmental schedule of India’s fourth generation Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). and

As it is, the Aeronautical Development Agency (ADA) is saddled in its task to make the LCA operational with the problem of qualifying the multi-mode radars (MMR) that hold the key to its weaponisation. Also, the delay in the development of indigenous Kaveri engine to replace the American-supplied GE-F404 engine has adversely affected the LCA programme. It is now proposed to rope in foreign agencies to complete both the weaponisation of the LCA and development and qualification of the Kaveri engine. The proposal would further delay the programme. Already, more time is expected to be taken in getting from Britain the Hawk advanced jet trainer for which a deal has already been finalized at a cost higher than the Price Negotiating Committee had fixed months ago.

Against such a bleak backdrop, Chief of the Air Staff S.P. Tyagi has recently made a case for the fast track procurement of 126 latest generation combat aircraft. He wrote to the Defence Minister recently: “Unless steps are taken to move ahead with the procurement, the IAF’s combat strength will deplete to a level that may entirely neutralise the forces’ conventional superiority over the Pakistan Air Force (PAF). Pakistan has planned to increase its strength from the present 19 Squadrons to 26 Squadrons by 2011-12, while the IAF could reduce it to 26.5 by 2015.”  As a matter of fact, the IAF’s proposal to buy 126 fighter planes was intended to provide a stop gap arrangement until the availability of the LCA Tejas and indigenously-produced SU-30-MKI by 2002. 

All available indications are that the procurement of the IAF’s demand for the 126 fighters would be a painfully slow process.  Even if the final Request For Proposal (RPF) is issued now, it could take upto two years to sign a contract, given the time taken for extensive trial evaluation, laborious technical talks, prolonged contract bargain and ultimate approval. It may take another two-three years for the first lot of the aircraft finally selected and for the HAL to set up its assembly lines. By the time the aircraft is selected and procured for induction into the IAF, the technology of the aircraft would become old and obsolete, which has all along been the tragedy of the Defence Ministry’s procurement programmes for the armed forces.

Such a situation, fast developing not only in the IAF but also the Army and the Navy, requires urgent attention of the Defence planners. It is easy to welcome guests and even CEOs from the militarily developed countries. President Putin’s two-day visit may have strengthened the Indo-Russian strategic cooperation and the joint development programmes between the two of “hypersonic” BrahMos missiles and the fifth generation fighter aircraft may well be greatly encouraging. At the same time, however, the armed forces’ short-term needs must be looked into fast, so that the combat readiness of the forces does not suffer. Any delay on this front will be at the nation’s peril. ---INFA

 (Copyright, India News and Feature Alliance)